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Environment1 
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Abstract 
China believes logistics in the contested environment is an Achilles’s heel for the U.S. Navy. It is 
therefore critical that we explore ways to develop capabilities to replenish potential combating 
forces through Next Generation Logistics Ships (NGLSs).  
The objective in this research is to study and analyze options for rearming, refueling, and 
resupplying in the contested and distributed environment. The framework created is flexible in 
terms of the scenarios. 
Feedback from subject matter experts (SMEs) helped us gain insight into the complexity of the 
problem and its vast scope. We developed mathematical models based on the scenarios 
approved by the sponsor. The sponsor did not wish us to model an objective of minimizing costs 
or the number of ships required to deliver commodities within a certain deadline or under a 
certain schedule. Measuring the number of deliveries required in a scenario supplied by SMEs 
allowed us to determine a mix of NGLS vessels without cost or deadline data. We would like to 
point out that the number of deliveries needed by vessels of each type, as described in the report, 
can be interpreted in many ways, in terms of the number of ships required. The summary of our 
results and analysis suggests certain recommendations. 
 
 
1 Please note that this is an abridged version of the original technical report. The full report is available as 
NPS-LM-20-155 at ARP. 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 303 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Introduction and Background 
The U.S. government came out publicly with an explicit statement that the so-called 
“nine-dash line,” which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) asserts delineates its claims in the 
South China Sea, is contrary to international law (Figure 1). China claims that the “nine-dash 
line” encircles as much as 90% of the contested waters. The line runs as far as 2,000 km from 
the Chinese mainland to within a few hundred kilometers of the Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Vietnam. The PRC maintains that it owns any land or features contained within the line, which 
confers vaguely defined “historical maritime rights” (Liu, 2016). It encircles the area where China 
demands economic rights. Another interpretation is that the line marks the islands and reefs 
China wants to control rather than the waters inside its boundaries. The PRC has long favored a 
strategy of ambiguity. It does not openly go against international law but prefers to leave space 
for its more ambitious claims (Apte et al., 2020). 
 
Figure 1. The Nine-Dash Line and Surrounding Countries 
China defiantly lands planes on artificial islands in the South China Sea while U.S. 
warships patrol in protest (Figure 2). The string of “unsinkable aircraft carrier” islands is an 
imminent threat to U.S. allies in Southeast Asia. This, plausibly, is where a war with China will 
likely be fought. When thinking in a geostrategic sense about China, the island-chain 
formulation is helpful. Since the 1950s, U.S. planners have described a first island chain, 
running from the Japanese islands through the Philippines and down to the tip of Southeast 
Asia. Dominating inside that line has been the goal of China’s recent buildup in naval and 
missile capabilities. But U.S. officials warn that Chinese strategists are becoming more 
ambitious, set on gaining influence up to the second island chain—running from Japan through 
the Micronesian islands to the tip of Indonesia (Figure 3). 
As with its initial forays into the South China Sea, China is using so-called scientific 
missions and hydrographic surveying ships as the tip of the spear. Japan and Singapore 
essentially serve as anchors at the north and south ends of the island chains. These two nations 
have been integrating their defense capabilities with the United States through training, 
exercises, and arms purchases. They are exploring better relations with India as the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans are increasingly viewed as a single strategic entity. This nascent alliance is a 
crucial element in the U.S. strategy for the region. 
China believes logistics in the contested environment is an Achilles’s heel for the U.S. 
Navy (USN). It is therefore critical that we explore ways to develop capabilities to replenish 
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Figure 2. Chinese Dredging Vessels in the Waters Around Mischief Reef in the Disputed Spratly Islands 
in the South China Sea 
 
Figure 3. First and Second Island Chains 
In this research, we offer a framework using mathematical models to refuel, rearm, and 
resupply for future logistics in such contested environments to support the potential combat 
operations of the USN. The resupply mission scenarios developed for this research are based 
on actual data supplied by subject matter experts (SMEs), but those data are disguised by the 
authors. At the foundation of the framework are the following research questions: 
1. Is the current fleet of vessels adequate to carry out the mission? 
2. Are there new vessels that can be modified or produced for the purpose of better 
sustainment through the three vectors of refuel, rearm, and resupply? 
3. If so, what type of vessels, and how many of each kind, should be acquired?  
In order to answer these questions, we first look at answers from existing literature on 
logistics, perhaps derived from a different environment. The capabilities of the new vessels 
mentioned in question 2 are based on top-level requirements supplied to the authors by SMEs. 
The methodology considers the supply chain from controlled zone to contested zone, utilizing 
only those new vessels. We develop and use different scenarios and methodologies to arrive at 
answers based on different objectives. We develop a framework for augmenting the current fleet 
with NGLSs for support in contested logistics. The objective is to study and analyze options for 
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Motivation for the New Vessels 
To optimize its future fleet logistics platforms, the USN and United States Marine Corps 
(USMC) are exploring the concept of a common hull, multi-mission auxiliary ship design. The 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David Berger, explained his perspective on 
amphibious forces, including the need for more small ships, at an Amphibious Warship 
Industrial Base Coalition event:  
I think our amphibious fleet has great capability. It is not enough for 2030. 
It is not enough for 2025. We need the big decks, absolutely. We need the 
LPD-17, that is the mothership, the quarterback and the middle. But we 
need a light amphibious force ship, a lot of them that we don’t have today. 
(Abott, 2020, para. 8) 
Abott (2020) continues that the Navy said this non-acquisition program will be one “that 
designs, develops, and tests the Integrated Naval Force Structure Assessment, to evaluate next 
generation medium platform solutions for logistics mission requirements in support of 
Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and Littoral Operations in Contested Environment 
(LOCE)” (para. 11). 
The USN and USMC announced that they will seek a medium amphibious ship that can 
support the kind of dispersed, agile, constantly relocating force described in the LOCE and 
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) concepts the Marine Corps has written, as 
well as the overarching DMO from the Navy (Eckstein, 2020). Marine Corps planners described 
the features they need on this medium amphibious ship. They not only wanted a ship that could 
move Marines around with some range, but they also wanted the ship to be able to beach itself, 
like a landing craft, to help offload gear and vehicles as needed. Presently, there is a new focus 
on the stern landing vessel designed by Australian company Sea Transport, which could serve 
as the new inspiration for the medium amphibious vessel as requirements development, EABO 
wargaming, and simulations take place. 
Future Surface Combatant Force is developing alternate surface ship force structure 
concepts and evaluating their cost and effectiveness, performing force-wide warfighting and 
mission effectiveness studies, identifying capabilities and characteristics needed to meet future 
threats, and developing a Technology Investment Strategy to help guide investments for an 
effective future fighting force. Our research supports this concept. 
Some of the vessels, NGLSs, will be commercial ship designs tailored to fit the top-level 
requirements that can conduct logistics missions in a contested environment. Through these 
new NGLS vessels, the USN will enable refueling, rearming, and resupply of naval assets, 
afloat and ashore, in support of LOCE and EABO (Katz, 2020). In a memorandum signed by the 
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Commandant of the USMC (O’Rourke, 2020), Force 
Structure Assessment (FSA) morphed into Integrated Naval FSA (INFSA), where Naval refers 
to Navy and Marine Corps. Acting Secretary of the Navy Modly announced that  
there are certain ship classes that don’t even exist right now that we’re 
looking at that will be added into that mix, but the broad message is, it’s 
going to be a bigger fleet, it’s going to be a more distributed fleet, it’s going 
to be a more agile fleet. And we need to figure out what that path is and 
understand our topline limitations. (O’Rourke, 2020) 
He added that the service is also considering new amphibious ships, as well as new kinds of 
supply ships and “lightly manned” ships that are “more like missile magazines that would 
accompany surface action groups” (O’Rourke, 2020).  
General David H. Berger, the commandant of the Marine Corps, states,  
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We must also explore new options, such as inter-theater connectors and 
commercially available ships and craft that are smaller and less expensive, 
thereby increasing the affordability and allowing acquisition at a greater 
quantity. We recognize that we must distribute our forces ashore given the 
growth of adversary precision strike capabilities, so it would be illogical to 
continue to concentrate our forces on a few large ships. The adversary will 
quickly recognize that striking while concentrated (aboard ship) is the 
preferred option. We need to change this calculus with a new fleet design 
of smaller, more lethal, and more risk-worthy platforms. (O’Rourke, 2020)  
We now offer a summary of certain requirements for these vessels that lead to their 
capabilities since we base our assumptions underlying the developed models on their top-
level requirements (TLRs). TLRs are design specifications of performance requirements 
for future ships. 
Description of the New Vessels: Next Generation Logistics Ships (NGLS) 
These vessels do not necessarily exist yet but have TLR thresholds defined for each 
performance dimension.  
Platform Supply Vessel (PSV) 
In summary, the vessel should have a sustained speed of about 11–12 knots. The range 
of travel for the platform supply vessel (PSV) is about 3,500 nm. Its fuel capacity needs to be 
about 20,000 bbl. Ammunition and cargo capacity needs to be adequate for replenishing cargo, 
ammunition, and fuel at sea from Combat Logistics Force (CLF), specifically, about 800–900 
short tons and deck area being about 10,000 sq ft. A major capability planned for the PSV is to 
deliver about 5,000 bbl of fuel in under about 2 hours at sea. In addition, it needs to be able to 
deliver 15 loads/hour of ammunition and/or cargo in parallel with refueling. This vessel will be 
unmanned throughout the operational cycle with organic support only when necessary. 
Autonomously executing the mission is a required capability of PSV. 
Fast Supply Vessel (FSV) 
Much smaller than the PSV but much faster, the sustained speed of a fast supply vessel 
(FSV) is 23 knots, and the range of travel is about 800–1000 nm. The fuel-storage capacity is 
required to be about 1,000 bbl. Deck area for ammunition and dry cargo is about 2,500 sq ft. A 
major capability planned for the FSV is to replenish the PSV in littorals. It also needs to do water 
transfers with hose reel with roll-on/roll-off capabilities. On shore, the FSV needs to be able to 
refuel at a minimum of about 500 gallons/minute with a 2,000-ft hose reel. It also needs to be 
capable of conducting missions for 2–3 days without replenishment. Finally, it needs to be able 
to transfer cargo to a pier or ashore.  
Light Amphibious Warships (LAW) 
These lighter ships will help the Navy and Marine Corps meet new challenges, including 
sea-control-and-denial operations. The light amphibious warships (LAW) will serve as maneuver 
and sustainment vessels to confront the changing character of warfare. The LAW will have 
beachability and the ability to maneuver shore to shore. It will also be able to provide transfer of 
fuel and cargo from T-ships on beaches and ports (developed and undeveloped) to forces within 
contested environments. The idea is to have a risk-worthy vessel (defensible enough that risks 
are not excessive or cheap enough that we can afford to lose it) with priority for personnel 
survivability. Being an amphibious vessel, the LAW should deal with 1:40 to 1:100 beach 
gradients. The loaded LAW should have a speed of about 18 knots. Thus, its speed is between 
the speeds of the PSV and FSV. Its minimum operating range is to be about 5,000 nm. It is to 
be capable of transferring 500 gallons/minute of fuel at sea or to shore. The LAW is to be 
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capable of conducting up to 11-day missions without replenishment. It is expected to receive, 
store, and transport up to 90,000 gallons of fuel in port as well as at sea. This fuel will be 
transferred at the rate of 150 gallons/minute in port as well as at sea. It can have four fueling 
stations around its cargo deck for filling trucks and vehicles. It has a crane with maximum 
outreach of about 14 T. It has a cargo area of about 10,000 sq ft and deck loading capacity of 
about 500 lb/sq ft. 
Our methodology derives a mathematical model based on capabilities for resource 
optimization for humanitarian missions (Apte & Yoho, 2018). However, we bear in mind the 
distinction between a contested environment and an uncontested environment, since the PSV 
and the FSV cannot defend themselves, but the LAW can. Therefore, if the NGLS ships do not 
encounter combat, the missions are similar. If they do encounter combat, the PSV and FSV will 
simply be lost, while the LAW will face an attrition rate. The attrition rates of these vessels have 
been estimated elsewhere (Dougherty et al., 2020). Since our results can simply be adjusted to 
account for those already estimated attrition rates, we do not model combat attrition in this 
study; we merely note that it is a factor which favors the LAW over the alternatives. In short, the 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) inference is relevant in the contested 
environment.  
Methodology  
We include the capacities of the vessels and offer an objective that minimizes the 
number of deliveries by the appropriate vessels on corresponding route. There exists a time 
constraint for total unload time to ships in the Weapon Engagement Zone (WEZ). To model this 
unload-time constraint, we modified capacities of the vessels per the time constraint in order to 
represent the time constraint of delivery. For example, if unload time was constrained to 1 hour, 
and an NGLS vessel could only unload 10 pallets in an hour or 5,000 BBL of fuel, we modified 
its cargo-capacity accordingly.  
These transportation/transshipment models consider controlled and contested zones. An 
assumption of the scenarios we were given is that most of the supplying vessels and Combat 
Logistics Force (CLF) are in the controlled zone, so there is transfer of commodities in the 
contested zone from NGLSs to the SAG and transshipment nodes. The transshipment node 
provides supplies for the different Expeditionary Advance Bases (EABs) on the shore in the 
contested zone. We developed models and analyzed scenarios for the NGLS vessels. The 
modes of transportation in the models and scenarios are the PSV, FSV, and LAW. Each of 
these vessels have certain preferred routes and requirements for capacities, loading/unloading, 
and platforms. These translate into restrictions and constraints for the models.  
We define a delivery as the carrying of commodities from a supply node to a demand 
node on the given route by a vessel designated to travel on that route. The models are executed 
using plausible but hypothetical numbers in order to maintain the unclassified nature of the 
report. The tables list the supply and demand at the nodes of the network. Though the results 
are based on hypothetical numbers, these numbers can be scaled up or down by using an 
appropriate multiplier.  
In the process of developing these models, given that the fuel (F) is stored separately 
from ammunition and supplies (A-S), we separated the models for F and A-S. Fuel capacity is 
measured in barrels, whereas ammunition and supplies are in pallets. In the case of A-S, both 
potentially occupy the same square footage of the vessels. Therefore, we combined these two 
commodities (A-S) when we developed square footage constraints for the models. The models 
for both F and A-S are very similar except for the supply, demand, and capacities.  
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Scenario: Capability Restricted Transportation  
We offer two scenarios and the corresponding models based on feedback from SMEs. 
Vessels allowed on the respective routes are shown in Figure 4-1. This scenario first looks at 
the entire network (Figure 4-1). We offer a different perspective by splitting the transshipment 
network into two separate transportation networks (Figure 4-2). In these scenarios, the model 
treats SAG (node 2) as one entity.  
 
Figure 4-1. Scenario Based on Subject Matter Expert Feedback 
 
Figure 4-2. Scenario Based on SME Feedback With Split 1 and Split 2 
As shown in Figure 4-2, Split 1 transports commodities from CLF to SAG and Transshipment, 
whereas Split 2 transports commodities from Transshipment to ASuW, FARP, and LOG. The 
advantage of splitting the entire/combined/transshipment network into two transportation 
networks is twofold. First, Split 1 focuses on the USN, whereas Split 2 focuses on the USMC. 
This helps in maintaining the needs of Marines ashore and Navy forces afloat. Second, 
transshipment of the commodities is assumed to be done sequentially, and though the two 
transportation networks have the same assumption, they can be executed in parallel, thus 
reducing total time. In the split model, of course, the supply from the transshipment node is set 
equal to the demand to the transshipment node. The corresponding model is given next.  
Model (Split) for Capability Restricted Transportation based on Scenarios in Figures 4.1 
and 4.2 for Fuel 
Total supply at node i for fuel = SFi,, Total demand at node j for fuel = DFj  
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Shared volume capacity for fuel on vessel k enroute from node i to node j = cFkij 
Modes of transportation, k: PSV =1, FSV = 2, LAW = 3  
Split 1 
Decision Variables: 
XFkij = flow of fuel from source i to node j on vessel k, i=1, j= 2, 3, k = 1 
Ykij = # of deliveries by vessels of type k from node i to j and l  
Objective Function: Minimize Number of Deliveries 
 112 113min( )y y+    
Constraints: 
Supply  at CLF = 1, 112 113 1( )F Fx x SF+ ≤   
Demand  at SAG = 2, 112 2Fx DF≥     
 at Transshipment = 3, 113 3Fx DF≥  
Capacity Fuel Volume 










   
Ykij’s integer and ≥ 0,  Xkij’s ≥ 0 
Split 2 
Decision Variables: 
XFkjl = flow of fuel from transshipment node j to sink l on vessel k, j=3, l=4, 5, 6, k = 2, 3 
Ykjl = # of deliveries by vessels of type k from node j to l  
Objective Function: Minimize Number of Deliveries 
 234 235 236 334 335 336min( )y y y y y y+ + + + +      
Constraints: 
Supply at Transshipment = 3, 234 235 236 334 335 336 3F F F F F Fx x x x x x SF+ + + + + ≤  
Demand at ASuW = 4, 234 334 4F Fx x DF+ ≥  
 at FARP = 5, 235 335 5F Fx x DF+ ≥  
 at LOG = 6, 236 336 6F Fx x DF+ ≥  
Capacity Fuel Volume 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 310 - 
































   
 Ykjl’s integer and ≥ 0, Xkjl’s ≥ 0 
Results 
We further evaluated the number of deliveries by the vessels by incorporating the 
restrictions on the vessels due to their capabilities. Top-level requirements for NGLSs informed 
us of the inability of certain vessels for transportation between certain nodes. These were 
incorporated in the structure of the scenarios and corresponding models. The supply and 
demand at the nodes and capacities of vessels in these scenarios are given in Table 1 for F and 
for Ammunition and Supplies. In Table 1, the capacity of vessels for ammunition and supplies is 
constrained from CLF to SAG by the length of time of 1 hour, the maximum time any ship in the 
SAG can be engaged for fueling. The assumption is that since the pallets are delivered at the 
rate of 60 pallets/hour, only 60 pallets can be delivered to SAG, though the true capacity of the 
PSV is 800 pallets.  
Table 1. Supply, Demand, and Capacities: Fuel in BBL and Ammunition and Supplies in Pallets 
 
In Table 2, results for the scenario in Figure 4-1 and 4-2 show that it is necessary to 
have a total of 11 deliveries for fuel and 6 for ammunition and supplies. It can be seen from 
Fuel in BBL Ammunition and Supplies in Pallets
Nodes Supply/Demand Supply/Demand
Supply at CLF 1 100000 100000
Supply at  Trans 3 6500 750
Demand at SAG 2 22000 100
Demand at Trans 3 6500 750
Demand at ASuW 4 100 50
Demand at FARP 5 6300 350
Demand at LOG 6 100 350
Routes Capacity Capacity
PSV from CLF 1 to SAG 2 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 5500 800
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1000 250
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 1000 250
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 1000 250
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 2200 1000
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 2200 1000
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 2200 1000
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Table 2 that the number of deliveries in the combined network and the total from Split networks 
are the same, however.  
Table 2. Minimum Number of Deliveries for Transportation of Fuel in BBL and Ammunition and Supplies 
in Pallets 
 
In order to offer another perspective, we further expanded the scenarios where we 
separate SAG 2 into three DDGs and one LCS (Figure 5-1) in one case and three DDGs and 
one FFG (Figure 5-2) in the other. It needs to be noted that splitting SAG in corresponding 
vessels offers better insight into the situation since it offers delivery numbers for each demand 
node. We believe this will further help decision-makers.  
In both scenarios, the demand node afloat is SAG, and demand nodes ashore are 
EABs, specifically ASuW, FARP, and LOG. It should also be noted that we used a period of 8 
days in this scenario, since it is the maximum period for a DDG between refueling events. This 
assumption forces an LCS in the first case and an FFG in the other to be refueled twice; 
therefore, we assumed the demand at LCS in the first case and FFG in the other to be twice as 
much. The increased demand for these vessels increases the deliveries to these ships and not 
to DDGs. Given the capacities of the NGLS vessels and the demand at LCS and FFG, the 
delivery numbers were different. In case of ammunition and supply replenishment, this scenario 
changes. DDGs can only be engaged for at most 1 hour for delivery of fuel. Therefore, we 
assumed that a corresponding A-S delivery, since it is done by the same vessel, can also be 
done in parallel for only 1 hour at the rate of 60 pallets per hour. If we remove this restriction for 
A-S delivery, the capacities change. The idea here is that the refueling can be done for one 
DDG at a time independently or consecutively (like a milk run). Though we separated SAG into 
different demand nodes, we did not execute the model for minimizing delivery time since 
approximate distances from CLF to each node in SAG would be similar. The model for these is:  
Models based on scenarios in Figure 5-1 and 5-2 for Fuel 
Total supply at node i for fuel = SFi,, Total demand at node j for fuel = DFj  
Shared volume capacity for fuel on vessel k enroute ij = cFkij 
Modes of transportation: PSV =1, FSV = 2, LAW = 3  
Decision Variables: 
XFkij = flow of fuel from source i to node j on vessel k, i=1, j= 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, and 3, k = 1 
XFkjl = flow of fuel from transshipment node j to sink l on vessel k, j=3, l=4, 5, and 6, k = 2, 3 
Combined Split 1 Split 2 Combined Split 1 Split 2
Deliveries Deliveries Deliveries Deliveries Deliveries Deliveries
PSV from CLF 1 to SAG 2 4 4 2 2
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 2 2 1 1
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1 0 1 0
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 0 0 0 0
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 1 1 0 0
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 0 1 0 1
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 3 3 1 1
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 0 0 1 1
Total 11 6 5 6 3 3
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Ykij = # of deliveries by vessels of type k from node i to j and l  
Objective Function: Minimize Number of Deliveries
112 1 112 2 112 3 112 4 113 234 235 236 334 335 336min( )y y y y y y y y y y y− − − −+ + + + + + + + + +     
Constraints:  
Supply at CLF = 1, 112 1 112 2 112 3 112 4 113 1( )F F F F Fx x x x x SF− − − −+ + + + ≤  
 at Transshipment = 3, 234 235 236 334 335 336 3F F F F F Fx x x x x x SF+ + + + + ≤  
Demand at DDG = 2-1, 112 1 2 1Fx DF− −≥  
 at DDG = 2-2, 112 2 2 2Fx DF− −≥  
 at DDG = 2-3, 112 3 2 3Fx DF− −≥  
 at LCS or FFG = 2-4, 112 4 2 4Fx DF− −≥     
 at Transshipment = 3, 113 3Fx DF≥  
 at ASuW = 4, 234 334 4F Fx x DF+ ≥  
 at FARP = 5, 235 335 5F Fx x DF+ ≥  
 at LOG = 6, 236 336 6F Fx x DF+ ≥  
Transshipment (Flow Balance) 
 113 234 235 236 334 335 336( ) 0F F F F F F Fx x x x x x x− + + + + + ≥  
Capacity Fuel Volume 
 
112 1 112 1 112 1
112 2 112 2 112 2
112 3 112 3 112 3
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Scenario: Separated SAG: Three DDGs and One LCS or Three DDGs and One FFG  
 
Figure 5-1. Scenario Based on Separated SAG: Three DDGs and One LCS 
Separating SAG into DDGs and LCS or FFG creates a unique difficulty in replenishment. 
However, we adjusted ship capacity to accommodate the differences between resupply periods.  
 
Figure 5-2. Scenario Based on Separated SAG: Three DDGs and One FFG 
The supply and demand at the nodes, and capacities of vessels, in these scenarios are given in 
Table 3 in case of LCS and in Table 4 in case of FFG. Assuming that DDG can sustain for 8 
days without refueling, FFG must be refueled every seven days and LCS every four days. We 
incorporated this by adjusting the demands for the given period in the models based on Figures 
5-1 and 5-2.  
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Table 3. Supply, Demand, and Capacities: Three DDGs and One LCS 
 
 




Fuel in BBL Ammunition and Supplies in Pallets
Supply/Demand Supply/Demand
Supply at CLF 1 1000000 100000
Supply at  Trans 3 6500 750
Demand at DDG 2-1 5000 25
Demand at DDG 2-2 5000 25
Demand at DDG 2-3 5000 25
Demand at LCS 2-4 3000 20
Demand at Trans 3 6500 750
Demand at ASuW 4 100 50
Demand at FARP 5 6300 350
Demand at LOG 6 100 350
Capacity Capacity
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-1 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-2 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-3 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-4 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 5500 800
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1000 250
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 1000 250
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 1000 250
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 2200 1000
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 2200 1000
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 2200 1000
Fuel in BBL Ammunition and Supplies in Pallets
Supply/Demand Supply/Demand
Supply at CLF 1 1000000 100000
Supply at  Trans 3 6500 750
Demand at DDG 2-1 5000 25
Demand at DDG 2-2 5000 25
Demand at DDG 2-3 5000 25
Demand at FFG 2-4 7000 25
Demand at Trans 3 6500 750
Demand at ASuW 4 100 50
Demand at FARP 5 6300 350
Demand at LOG 6 100 350
Capacity Capacity
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-1 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-2 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-3 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-4 5500 60
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 5500 800
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1000 250
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 1000 250
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 1000 250
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 2200 1000
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 2200 1000
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 2200 1000
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The results with LCS are given in Table 5. Table 6 describes the results with FFG.  
Table 5. Minimum Number of Deliveries for Transportation of Fuel in BBL and Ammunition and Supplies 
in Pallets: Three DDGs and One LCS 
 
 
Table 6. Minimum Number of Deliveries for Transportation of Fuel in BBL and Ammunition and Supplies 
in Pallets: Three DDGs and One FFG 
 
Summary, Analysis, and Conclusion 
Feedback from the SME helped us gain insight into the complexity of the problem and its 
vast scope. We used this input to refine our scenarios. We developed mathematical models 
based on these scenarios. We have listed those scenarios that will offer decision-makers with a 
choice based on their requirement. We constrained the capacity based on the maximum time a 
ship can be engaged in a supply event to reflect the delivery time.  
The top-level requirements of the vessels under consideration, as we understood, 
incorporate capability of a vessel on a certain route based on speed, platform, and capacity. 
The fuel storage tanks are separate from the storage for ammunition and supplies. Hence, we 
kept these two commodities separate. Fuel has its own issues, and so do ammunition and 
supplies. Note that the separate trips for these two commodities could be combined when trying 
to operationalize these results into a schedule involving a particular number of ships. 
The sponsor did not wish us to model an objective of minimizing costs (which were not 
available) or the number of ships required to deliver commodities within a certain deadline or 
Fuel Ammunition and Supplies
Deliveries Deliveries
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-1 1 1
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-2 1 1
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-3 1 1
PSV from CLF 1 to LCS 2-4 1 1
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 2 1
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1 1
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 0 0
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 1 0
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 0 0
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 3 1
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 0 1
Total 11 8
Fuel Ammunition and Supplies
Deliveries Deliveries
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-1 1 1
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-2 1 1
PSV from CLF 1 to DDG 2-3 1 1
PSV from CLF 1 to LCS 2-4 2 1
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 2 1
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1 0
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 0 0
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 1 0
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 0 1
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 3 1
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under a certain schedule (because deadlines and schedules change based on operational 
priorities). Measuring the number of deliveries required allowed us to determine a mix of NGLS 
vessels without addressing cost, deadline, or scheduling restrictions.  
In our model, number of deliveries are the deliveries made by a specific vessel, from a 
supply node to a demand node, on a specific route for a specific commodity. We would like to 
point out that deliveries can be interpreted in many ways. For example, a LAW making 13 
deliveries of fuel to FARP can be (a) 13 LAWs (making one delivery each), or (b) seven LAWs 
(six LAWs making two deliveries each and one LAW making one delivery), or six LAWs (making 
one delivery each, and one LAW making seven of the 13 deliveries). Thus, it is up to the 
decision-makers to determine how they would like to interpret and implement the results. A 
decision-maker may go for 13 LAWs if the cost is reasonable and the environment is highly 
contested. But if it is not, perhaps seven LAWs will be adequate. Again, the number of deliveries 
may be interpreted by the decision-makers based on their preference and available budget, and 
there could be many such interpretations. Similar statements can be made about PSVs or 
FSVs. For example, if there are five deliveries made by PSVs, it could mean that (a) there are 
five PSVs making one delivery each, or (b) two PSVs making two deliveries each and one PSV 
making one. One must note, however, that the deliveries will be constrained by overall capacity 
of the vessel. If one PSV tops out after four deliveries, then the interpretation would change. It 
would be entirely up to the decision-makers to decide how they would want to interpret the 
solution. In Table 7 we summarize the results of the scenarios.  
Table 7. Summary of Scenario Results  
 
The models we have developed are scalable. The scenarios can be expanded as per 
the requirement of number of demand nodes. For example, if there are three SAGs that must be 
supported, the demand of one SAG in our scenario can be multiplied by three. Of course, in that 
case, the number of deliveries will increase. Or there may be more than one ASuW Strike EAB, 
say two, or both of these cases may exist. In that case, the demand for that demand node can 
be doubled. Such adjustments can be also be made to distances or when minimum time for 






























Scenario Based on Figure 4-1 and 4-2
Combined 6 2 3 11 3 1 2 6
Split 1 and Split 2 6 1 4 11 3 0 3 6
Scenario Based on Separated SAG: 3 DDGs 
and LCS (Figure 5-1) 6 2 3 11 5 1 2 8
Scenario Based on Separated SAG: 3 DDGs 
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Table 8. Minimum Deliveries With Increased Demand Nodes: Fuel in BBL and Ammunition and Supplies 
in Pallets 
 
As stated earlier, we did not incorporate load and unload time. Incorporating load and 
unload time might increase the total time for deliveries. This may lead to acquisition of more 
vessels so the actual transportation and delivery can be done in parallel to reduce the time. For 
example, in case four PSVs are needed to deliver required fuel to SAG (based on the 
assumptions about distance and speed of the PSV), and that a warship can only be engaged for 
at most 1 hour for this delivery, our model shows it takes a total of 7 days. However, given that 
DDGs can sustain for 8 days after one refueling event and there are three DDGs in a SAG, an 
acquisition strategy for acquiring four PSVs so each PSV takes less than 2 days to deliver may 
be a better solution than one PSV making four deliveries in 7 days. Again, this is a choice the 
decision-makers can make based on the flexibility of these models.  
Based on our analysis, we recommend the following to negotiate battlespace 
constraints. We suggest that the time constraint for a PSV engaging with SAG in WEZ should 
be investigated, since that is the binding constraint on capacity to transfer. The capacity of the 
PSV for carrying fuels is much larger than that, and the same is true for transferring the pallets 
of ammunition and supplies. It will be necessary to increase the rate of transfer if the time spent 
in the WEZ cannot be altered. Our capacity assumptions were based on threshold as opposed 
to objective TLRs. Hence, objective TLRs may be the direction to go. This may need tweaking 
at the TLRs and some platform modification so that sustainment can be made much faster and 
with fewer deliveries. We summarize the number of deliveries made by FSV and LAW for each 
of the scenarios in Table 9.  
Based on this summary, one can see that the most FSVs needed for each of these 
scenarios to transport fuel are two, whereas for the same scenarios, five LAWs are also 
needed. Similarly, the most FSVs needed for each of these scenarios to transport ammunition 
and supplies is one. However, three LAWs are also needed for those scenarios. These results 
and our analysis therefore suggest that acquisition of LAWs is preferred to FSVs, since it may 
be prohibitively expensive to maintain a separate maintenance support infrastructure for FSVs 
when their range of usefulness is relatively narrow. A closer examination of those instances in 
which the model recommended FSVs on a route reveals that, in every case, a LAW could have 
accomplished the resupply mission in an equal number of trips. That is, the model 









PSV from CLF 1 to SAG 2 12 5 4 2 12 5
PSV from CLF 1 to Trans 3 2 1 2 1 2 1
FSV from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
FSV from Trans 3 to FARP 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
FSV from Trans 3 to LOG 6 0 0 1 0 0 0
LAW from Trans 3 to ASuW 4 1 1 1 1 1 1
LAW from Trans 3 to FARP 5 3 1 3 1 3 1
LAW from Trans 3 to LOG 6 1 1 0 1 1 1
Total 19 9 11 6 19 9
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FSV does not look very useful in these scenarios, these scenarios did not require the TLRs 
(especially speed, since deadlines were not given) in which that ship dominated the others. 
 
Table 9. Deliveries by FSV and LAW 
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Scenario
Scenario Based on Subject Matter Expert 
Feedback (Figure 4-1 and 4-2)
Combined
Split 1 and Split 2
Scenario Based on Separated SAG: 3 DDGs 
and LCS with Sustainment (Figure 5-1)
Scenario Based on Separated SAG: 3 DDGs 
and FFG with Sustainment (Figure 5-2)
Scenario Based on Increased Demand Nodes
Three SAGS
Two ASuWs
Three SAGs, Two ASuWs













1 3 1 2
2 4 0 3
2 3 1 2
2 3 0 3
0 5 0 3
0 5 0 3
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